Brian Ortmann (University of Hamburg)
Schedule
| 15:50–16:00 | Brian Ortmann (University of Hamburg): Welcome & Introduction |
| 16:00–16:45 | Alexander Gebharter (Marche Polytechnic University): Does Manipulation Imply Causation? |
| 16:45–17:30 | Beate Krickel (TU Berlin): Manipulability and Constitution |
| 17:30–17:45 | Coffee Break |
| 17:45–18:30 | Bram Vaassen (Umeå University): Why Causal Structure is Not Normative – A Parable |
| 18:30–19:15 | Samuel Lee (University of Hamburg): Confounded Manipulation and How to Screen it |
| 19:15–19:30 | Brian Ortmann (University of Hamburg) Closing Remarks |
Brian Ortmann (University of Hamburg):
Introduction & Closing Remarks: Does Manipulation Imply Causation?
It is well known that correlation does not imply causation. For example, ice cream sales are positively correlated with drowning deaths, but buying an ice cream is hardly what causes people to drown. If correlation does not imply causation, however, what does? One influential answer appeals to manipulation. As James Woodward famously puts it, causal relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control. But does manipulability really imply causation? This workshop welcomes contributions on this question, as well as talks more broadly related to interventionism, causal modelling, and the metaphysics of causation.
Alexander Gebharter (Marche Polytechnic University):
Does manipulation imply causation?
This talk focuses on how manipulation is related to causation. I argue that whether manipulation implies causation depends on further conceptual and metaphysical assumptions about causal relations and their relata. I then explore different combinations of such assumptions and their consequences for whether manipulation implies causation as well as a selection of related puzzles.
Beate Krickel (TU Berlin):
Manipulability and Constitution
When my muscle makes my arm move, the muscle does not cause my arm to move. Rather, the muscle’s movements constitute the arm’s movements. While constitution is a non-causal relationship, it is still potentially exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control. Thus, it seems that manipulability does not imply causation. In this talk, I discuss the most influential account of constitution in terms of mutual manipulability (Craver 2007) and argue that, contrary to appearances, it does not conflict with the general claim that manipulability implies causation.
Bram Vaassen (Umeå University):
Why Causal Structure is Not Normative – a Parable
TBA
Samuel Lee (University of Hamburg):
Confounded Manipulation and How to Screen It
Common causes render correlation an unreliable guide to causal structure. Manipulation is vulnerable to an analogous form of confounding. In a hybrid fork, Z metaphysically influences X while causally influencing Y, so manipulating Xmay change Y even though X does not cause Y. Screening off is the natural remedy. But existing screening proposals point in the wrong directions. One half of Yablo’s proportionality condition requires distal causes not to be screened off by more proximate mediators, while the other half—retained in Woodward’s realisation independence—requires more proximate mediators to screen off the distal causes whose influence they mediate. Both requirements mistake ordinary features of causal mediation for evidence against causation: a mediator normally screens off a mediated cause, but need not do so when the latter also influences the effect along another path. Worse, their problems are not confined to mediated structures, as these proposals fail even to screen off the hybrid confounding that motivates their use here. I argue that the analogue of ordinary common-cause deconfounding instead asks whether a metaphysical influence on X nontrivially screens X off from Y. Just as causes in purely causal structures must not be screened off from behind, causes in hybrid structures must not be screened off from below.
Time: 3rd of September, 15:50 – 19:30
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 