Julian Reiss
Johannes Kepler University Linz
The concept of scientific objectivity has long been central to the philosophy of science. However, in recent times traditional accounts, such as the value-free ideal, have faced sustained criticism for their inadequacy in addressing the indispensable role of value judgements in scientific inquiry. This paper proposes a novel virtue-theoretic framework, drawing on Aristotelian normative ethics, to understand objectivity not as an epistemic property of scientific claims, methods, or processes, but as a character virtue of the scientists themselves. By situating objectivity within Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, I see it as a disposition to navigate judiciously between two epistemic vices, thereby fostering reliable and responsible knowledge production in context-specific ways.
Aristotle’s eudaimonistic ethics posits virtues as means between extremes of excess and deficiency, cultivated through practical wisdom (phronesis) to achieve excellence in action. Applied to science, objectivity emerges as the virtue of maintaining epistemic integrity amid value-laden practices. The first vice, akin to excess, is the politicisation of science, wherein non epistemic values — such as ideological commitments or personal and financial interests — adversely shape research questions, methodologies, or interpretations, leading to biased outcomes and eroded public trust. Historical episodes, like Lysenkoism in Soviet biology, ‘German Physics’ or contemporary debates over climate science funding, exemplify this peril, where values overwhelm empirical rigour.
Conversely, the vice of deficiency manifests as ‘sweeping values under the carpet’, a pretence of complete value-neutrality that engenders other kinds of adverse behaviours. Scientists adopting this stance may exhibit intransparency about implicit value judgments in model assumptions, data selection, or risk assessments, fostering a false veneer of impartiality. This not only invites unexamined biases but also undermines the scrutiny of scientific results, as unacknowledged values leave research vulnerable to critique without adequate justification. For instance, in public health modelling during pandemics, ignoring equity values in resource allocation can lead to ethically flawed policies presented as ‘purely scientific’.
The virtuous mean requires phronetic discernment: scientists must integrate values transparently and proportionately, tailoring their approach to the epistemic demands of the context. In high stakes domains like environmental policy, this might involve explicit value-laden deliberations to enhance robustness; in basic research, it could mean rigorous methodological safeguards against undue influence. This conception stresses that objectivity is not a static ideal but a dynamic, agent-centred practice, cultivated through reflective habits and institutional support.
By reframing objectivity as a virtue, this paper contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy of science, offering a normative pathway beyond the value-free/value-laden dichotomy. It implies reforms in scientific training, emphasising ethical phronesis alongside technical expertise, and underscores the role of diverse scientific communities in calibrating the mean. Ultimately, this virtue-theoretic model promotes a more resilient and accountable science, better equipped to navigate the complexities of value-infused inquiry. Not to mention: it provides a response to the so-called ‘New Demarcation Problem’ due to Bennet Holman and Torsten Wilholt (Holman and Wilholt 2022)
Time: 4th of September, 16:45 – 18:15
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 