Aleksander Kałuski
University of Warsaw
There is a growing concern that analytic philosophers rely too heavily on intuitions when formulating their arguments (Cappelen 2012; Schuringa 2025). In this talk, I argue that the reliance on intuition corrupts the soundness of analytical arguments through the example of the “”zombie”” argument (Chalmers 1996).
The “”intuitions problem”” is particularly relevant in the case of the “”zombie”” argument for several reasons. First, critics label the argument as “”intuition talk”” that fails to provide sufficient justification (Barnett 2008; Dennett 1995). However, Herman Cappelen (2012) contends the argument does not rely on intuitions at all. Secondly, there are various notions of “”intuition””. Intuitions can be beliefs, sui generis states, or dispositions (Pust 2012) as well as sets of descriptive features (Cappelen 2012). Thus, philosophers often disagree over what intuitions are suitable for the “”zombie”” argument instead of whether intuitions are used in it. Finally, Chalmers (2014) admits that he relies on intuitions, but asserts their validity in philosophical methodology (Chalmers 2014).
I believe that the reliance on intuitions affects the validity of analytic arguments. If someone believes that intuitions justify the premises of an argument, and the logical structure of the argument is sound, then what room is left for debating the argument’s premises? Furthermore, experimental research shows that our intuitions are highly sensitive to linguistic bias. Words such as “”zombies”” invoke different intuitions than other words with similar meanings employed in the same context (Fischer and Sytsma 2021). Thus, when one relies on intuitions, small shifts in semantics dominate the logical form of the argument. What is more, different notions of intuition vary in justificatory power. As long as the notion of intuition is not set, the premises are not justified.
I address these issues in the context of the “”zombie”” argument, enriched with empirical results from cognitive science.
Barnett, David. 2008. “The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.” Noûs 42 (2): 308–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00682.x
Cappelen, Herman. 2012. Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001
Chalmers, David J. 2014. “Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense.” Philosophical Studies 171 (3): 535–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0288-x
Chalmers, David John. 1996. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Philosophy of mind series. Oxford university press
Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. “The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4): 322–26
Fischer, Eugen, and Justin Sytsma. 2021. “Zombie Intuitions.” Cognition 215 (October): 104807. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104807
Pust, Joel. 2012. Intuition. December 4. https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/intuition/
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SOPhiA 2026 