The Paradox of Disagreement

Antonia Grunert

Universität Leipzig

The paper argues that interpersonal disagreement, i.e., disagreement among different thinkers, exhibits a paradoxical nature: Even though it is possible for a thinker to think of herself as having disagreed with another thinker in the past, there is a logical problem of identifying a state of interpersonal disagreement in the present. This is because in order to identify a state of disagreement, it is necessary to commit to two requirements: On the one hand, it is logically required of the one who takes herself to be in disagreement with another thinker to interpret the other thinker’s words as an expression of that speaker’s rational capacities. That is, she must assume that the other thinker made a judgment that is supported by reasons. On the other hand, she must fully assert what the other speaker negates, or fully negate what the other thinker asserts. Therefore, she must consider herself to be certain about the matter on which she takes herself and the other thinker to be in disagreement. I will argue for each requirement in turn and show how in combination, they force the thinker who takes herself to be in a state of interpersonal disagreement to think of the other thinker as wrong but, nevertheless, reasonable. Paradoxically, this can only be done in an effort that culminates in overcoming disagreement.

The upshot of this will be that first-person indicative present tense thoughts of interpersonal disagreement, i.e., thoughts that may get expressed by the words “I disagree,” are logically problematic. Philosophers who engage with interpersonal disagreement within the epistemology of disagreement usually work with the tacit assumption that there is an asymmetry between intrapersonal and interpersonal disagreement: While it is generally acknowledged to be logically impossible to coherently disagree with oneself, it seems logically unproblematic for thinkers to disagree with one another. Therefore, it is assumed that there should not be a philosophically interesting problem of identifying interpersonal disagreement; rather, it is supposed that the philosophically interesting problems arise only after disagreement has been identified. My paper seeks to challenge these assumptions. 

Chair: Alicia M. Wach

Time: 18:50 – 19:20

Location: HS E.002