Jana Engel
Universität des Saarlandes
Can an organisation believe that their project has no negative environmental impact even though most of their members think otherwise? The question what group beliefs are is heavily discussed in recent philosophy. It is unclear whether group beliefs are constituted by (some of) the beliefs of their members, as for example Jennifer Lackey (2021) suggests, or whether groups can form beliefs that none of their members have, as philosophers such as Margaret Gilbert (1987) propose. As our concept of collective belief shapes which beliefs we attribute to groups, the answer to this question has massive implications for matters of collective rationality and morality.
I attempt to reverse engineer group beliefs from their rational actions. I argue that, in order to determine the beliefs of a group we should focus on its actions. Assuming that it is rational for a group to do what it thinks would fulfil its preferences as far as possible, collective beliefs and preferences are closely linked to collective decision-making. Therefore, we can reconstruct the group’s beliefs that justify their actions as rational. This is especially interesting for scenarios in the debate often describe voting cases in which candidates are nominated, or a statement must be given. In these scenarios members vote not only for group beliefs, but also for subsequent group actions as a nomination or declaration. While it is plausible that in most of these cases groups indeed report their beliefs, it is also possible that the rational action is another one depending on their preferences. For instance, a competition’s committee could have a stronger preference for another person getting the price money than for giving a truthful report, which could make the rational action not to report their belief. In my talk I show how such an account can be developed and how it can be applied to some relevant cases in the literature.
Chair: tba
Time:
Location:
SOPhiA 2026 