In Search of Closure – Sensitivity and Deductive Knowledge

Simon Eggersmann

Heidelberg University

The sensitivity account of knowledge is a famous but rarely defended theory in contemporary epistemology. Most commonly, it is rejected on the basis of its denying plausible principles of epistemic closure, i.e., there are cases in which S knows a proposition p, competently deduces q from p, and yet fails to thereby know q.

The central claim of this talk is that this rejection is premature: There is a principled way of incorporating deductive knowledge into a sensitivity account, thereby meaningfully extending the theory. At the same time, this new extended theory preserves the characteristic features of sensitivity and can plausibly explain the heterogeneous results that the original account faces.

The most developed criticism of sensitivity from nonclosure is Kripke’s famous objection from a phenomenon he calls absorption. I differentiate between two kinds of absorption, illustrate both in detail, and showcase how these object to the sensitivity account. In response to this criticism, I argue that Nozick does not deny the possibility of transmitting knowledge via deduction in general. On the contrary, he proposes his own closure principle, to complement his underlying theory. This so-called Nozick-Closure is the pivotal element to prove deductive knowledge and sensitivity compatible, without sacrificing the characteristic properties of the former.

This talk defends the sensitivity account by showing that Nozick-Closure extends the original sensitivity account in the right way to answer the objections put forward by critics. In particular, it discusses Kripke’s critique from absorption as well as related objections: Abominable conjunctions, the heterogeneity problem of higher-order knowledge, and Goldman’s dachshund-example. Each objection can be plausibly met by a careful application of Nozick-Closure, further strengthening the plausibility of this extended theory.

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