David Lussi
University of Bern
According to explanationism about normative reasons, a fact is a reason for an agent to φ insofar as it explains a normative fact related to the agent and φ-ing. One influential version of this view, good-explanationism, holds that reasons are facts that explain what would be good. A standard objection to good-explanationism is that it conflicts with the motivational constraint, according to which a fact is a reason to φ only if it is possible to φ on the basis of that fact. In particular, good-explanationism appears to entail the existence of what I call motivationally inert reasons: reasons that count in favor of things that cannot be done or had on the basis of motivating reasons. Since things of this kind can be good, good-explanationism seems to entail such reasons. By contrast, ought-explanationism, the view that reasons are facts that explain what agents ought to do, is often thought to avoid this problem because plausible constraints on ought exclude motivationally inert reasons. I argue, however, that although ought-explanationism does not entail the existence of motivationally inert reasons, it entails the existence of a different kind of reasons that is incompatible with the motivational constraint: “elusive reasons.” These are reasons such that it is impossible for the agent to be aware of them, making it impossible to respond on the basis of them. My argument is based on two claims. First, in cases of elusive reasons, the relevant agent ought to respond in the way that is favored by the elusive reason. Second, this fact about what the agent ought to do is plausibly explained by the fact that constitutes the elusive reason. If these two claims are correct, it follows from ought-explanationism that elusive reasons are genuine normative reasons. Thus, the two most influential explanationist views are both incompatible with the motivational constraint.
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SOPhiA 2026 