Giorgio Geuna
LMU Munich
The multiple realizability argument consists in inferring that mental properties are not physical properties from the premise that they admit a highly heterogeneous range of possible physical realizations. Depending on the degree of heterogeneity that is considered sufficient for genuine multiple realizability, this inference may extend to paradigmatically physical properties. In this paper, I will argue that a strong version of the argument, requiring an extreme degree of heterogeneity, succeeds in avoiding this generalization, whereas a weaker one extends its conclusion to paradigmatically physical properties such as temperature.
As I will show, the instances of temperature share enough physical features that they do not count as multiply realizable according to the highly demanding requirement that instances of a multiply realizable property share little or no physical causal powers. Hence, if this requirement was met by mental properties, then the multiple realizability argument would be safe from generalizing to temperature.
However, it is implausible that this is the case, since it is doubtful that even properties significantly more physically heterogeneous than mental properties meet it. At the same time, a weaker characterization of multiple realizability, phrased in terms of differences in the performing of the same function between the instances of a property, applies to temperature. Hence, such weaker version of the argument is subjected to the charge of generalization to temperature.
I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, as it stands, cannot be employed to maintain a nonreductivist account of mental properties without also committing to a nonreductivist account of properties like temperature, unless a suitably intermediate version of the argument is developed.
Chair: tba
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SOPhiA 2026 