Veronika Lassl
University of Vienna
In his 2022 book The A Priori Without Magic, Jared Warren develops a theory of epistemic a priori warrant. As part of it, he claims that there are synthetic a priori truths, for example: (CRIM-RED) “Everything crimson is red”. However, according to Warren, (CRIM-RED) is not only a synthetic a priori truth, but also a necessary one. In this talk, I argue that these three features of (CRIM-RED) – syntheticity, apriority and necessity – are in tension with a part of Warren’s general account of apriority. The tension can be resolved with a small retreat.
Warren defends a meaning-based theory of apriority. The central idea here is that a priori truths have special relationships to meaning. Specifically: (1) their truth is a “mere reflection” or “by-product” of what we mean (Warren 2022, 28); and (2) meaning explains why we can know them a priori. Warren thinks meaning is determined by inference rules which are either deductive or non-deductive. He considers a case where (CRIM-RED) is acquired non-deductively and argues it is synthetic, a priori and necessary. I argue that the only interpretation of the case where (CRIM-RED) is synthetic, a priori and necessary is one that assumes the existence of a necessary containment relation about color experiences as truth-makers for (CRIM-RED). But if this is admitted, then contra (1), (CRIM-RED)’s truth is not a “mere reflection” or “by-product” of meaning. To resolve the tension, I conclude, Warren should concede that there are some a priori truths, whose truth consists in meaning together with further facts. This is a small modification of the overall account.
References:
Warren, Jared. 2022. The A Priori Without Magic. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009030472.”
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SOPhiA 2026 