Leon Schmitt
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Conceptual analysis of concepts such as responsibility and rationality often leads to an impasse. Competing accounts differ in their commitments and implications, but none of them is inconsistent. This generates two problems: One is how to choose between such accounts. This problem is accompanied by the concern that the only “basis” for adjudicating such conflicts are our intuitions, which would threaten the epistemic prospects of our inquiry. The second problem is the worry that the disagreement between the positions is merely terminological.
I argue that some of these disputes can be resolved by understanding concepts as tools embedded in social and practical life. Concepts serve characteristic functions within our practices, and attention to these functions provides a principled basis for evaluating competing analyses. On this view, rejecting an account because of its consequences is legitimate when those consequences would prevent the concept from fulfilling the role it plays in our lives. Functional adequacy thus supplies a criterion for theory choice beyond intuitive fit. To develop this proposal into a broader methodology for conceptual analysis, I identify several factors relevant to determining a concept’s practical point and discuss how these factors constrain acceptable analyses.
I locate my proposal in relation to existing approaches and note its theoretical commitments. I argue that the commitments involved are not peculiar to my view but are implicit in any plausible analysis of practical concepts.
This perspective on the concepts we investigate also provides a basis for defusing the second problem. The charge that such conflicts are merely terminological is, in some respects, accurate. However, a correct understanding of our concepts’ place in our life and their analysis shows that this does not threaten the import of our conceptual investigations.
Chair: tba
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SOPhiA 2026 