Requirements and Coercion in War: An Argument for Ad Bellum Pacifism

Kida Lin

University of Oxford

Suppose that 1,000 innocent people will be killed by a runaway trolley unless Y diverts it onto a side track where it will kill X. Y announces that he does not plan to intervene. Z then coerces Y to do so – she credibly threatens that, unless he does, she will break both his arms. I argue that (1) X would not, if the choice were herself, be required to divert the trolley towards herself; (2) because of (1), Y is not required to divert the trolley towards X; and (3) because of (2), Z is not permitted to coerce Y to divert the trolley. I then consider this argument’s implications for war. I argue that just combatants are the moral equivalents of Y; just decision-makers are the moral equivalents of Z; and the innocent people whom just combatants will inevitably kill if they fight in a war are the moral equivalents of X. The takeaway, I shall show, is a plausible form of ad bellum pacifism.

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