Andrea Huete Rodríguez
University of Barcelona
Carlson et al. (2025) offer a new argument for the existence of moral luck drawing on a distinction between first-order and second-order control. They propose a case where two individuals lack second-order control while nonetheless differing in blameworthiness because only one of them has first-order control over the relevant wrongful actions. This, they claim, reveals a form of moral luck not considered in standard discussions. I argue that this conclusion does not follow.
The case they present is not a case of moral luck, but a case of inappropriate judging. This is because we can morally evaluate moral agents for their actions but we cannot evaluate them for actions that they have not had a part in. In the
case proposed by Carlson et al., the lack of first-order control that one of the two individuals suffers from is the result of a direct, intentional intervention in the psychology of said individual by a third individual. Such an intervention would clearly suppress the personal identity of the affected individual. Because of this, it would be completely unreasonable to evaluate said individual for whatever actions are performed via their body. Morally evaluating this person in regard to these actions would make as much sense as evaluating a totally unrelated person with respect to them.
Thus, it is not that we judge the individual who lacks first-order control as less blameworthy than the one who has it for their wrongful actions, which would make the case one of moral luck. What is actually happening is that we refrain from judging the individual because their total lack of first-order control can only come at the cost of their existence as the individual they are.
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SOPhiA 2026 