Martin Nosek
Masaryk University
Consider the proposition that God would be necessarily godly. Some have drawn from the proposition that God is impossible, whereas others have drawn from it (in modal ontological arguments) that God is necessary. In the talk, I first investigate some intuitions regarding worth and the attitude of worship that may support the proposition. Then, I proceed to present reasons for each of the conclusions—that atheism follows from the proposition and that theism follows from it—as they can be developed in some contemporary broadly rationalist theories of the epistemology of modality. I argue that the reasons on both sides fail because of their equal weight. Finally, I discuss the broader implications for the epistemology of modality. I address the question of whether some form of modal skepticism follows from an argument very similar to the one I used to arrive at my conclusion. It would follow that the acceptance and denial of almost any modal proposition are equally justified. I attempt to resolve the problem by appealing to the asymmetry of modal intuitions regarding most possibilities. I suggest that it follows from my conclusion that a priori modal knowledge is inherently limited, but the limitations are not global, and the possibility of complete a posteriori modal knowledge is left open.
Chair: tba
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SOPhiA 2026 