Pavel Matail
Masaryk University
Libertarians about free will believe that free will exists, although it is incompatible with determinism. According to them, somewhere in the deliberation process, an event E is not determined. The critics often point out that if both E’s occurrence and non-occurrence at time t are compatible with the laws of nature and the past before t, then E is a purely random outcome, and as such cannot be under the agent’s control. This objection is sometimes called the Problem of Luck. Surprisingly, the objection did not trigger a broad dismissal of libertarianism, but neither did it prompt much effort to modify it. The contemporary critics are convinced that the objection refutes libertarian theories. In contrast, libertarians do not usually deem the objection as serious.
In the talk, I will first present the Difference Argument, a cross-world formulation of the Problem of Luck. This argument rests on a definition of luck that renders any undetermined E as a matter of luck. Therefore, to avoid its conclusion, one must provide (i) a more acceptable definition of luck and (ii) a corresponding definition of luck-excluding control that an agent possesses over E. Second, I will cast doubt on Randolph Clarke’s view that (i) luck is involved only in uncaused Es and (ii) active control consists in E’s being caused by the agent’s reasons or intentions. By appealing to cases of unbalanced probabilities, I will demonstrate that we would not intuitively count such Es as controlled. Third, I will challenge Meghan Griffith’s view that (i) luck is involved only in passively caused Es and (ii) agent-caused Es are necessarily active. By introducing an agent-causal zombie argument, I will show that we can conceive that E is non-deterministically agent-caused for a reason, although still passively caused, and therefore vulnerable to luck. Finally, I will indicate how to adjust the theory of agent causation so that it provides luck-excluding active control.
Chair: tba
Time:
Location:
SOPhiA 2026 