The Limits of Parental Control over Minors’ Sexual Lives

Zofia Sierant

Jagiellonian University

Contemporary sexual ethics holds that informed consent is a necessary condition for the permissibility of sexual activity. At least three conditions of informed consent are typically identified: its voluntariness, possession of adequate knowledge of the relevant facts, and competence to understand the nature of the act to which a person is consenting. The subject of my analysis is the last of these conditions. In most legal systems, competence to consent to sexual activity is legally presumed from the moment a person reaches the age of consent, which is usually set below the age of majority.
At the same time, prevailing theories of parental rights justify parental authority over minors based on their incomplete decisional competence. On this basis, it is assumed that parents may restrict the sexual activity of their children. Parents may forbid their children from engaging in sexual activities altogether. My argument aims to demonstrate that both positions are mutually inconsistent: if a minor above the age of consent is recognised as competent to consent to sex, parental interference in their sexual decisions cannot be justified by a lack of that competence.
I will also analyse the analogy between sexual consent and consent to medical procedures as a possible way out of this contradiction. In Poland, children cannot consent to medical procedures until the age of 16, with consent being given on their behalf by their parents. After the age of 16, consent to medical procedures must be given by both the parent and the child. One might therefore argue that sexual consent could operate analogously in this case. Since minors are not fully competent, their decision-making in sexual matters ought to be limited. I will, however, reject this analogy. Sexual consent can only be given by the person who is granting it. There is no way to make a surrogate decision in a sexual regard. Additionally, in sexual practice, the principle of beneficence does not operate. We cannot justify making decisions about someone’s sexual life by referring to their own good. The value of a sexual activity lies in the possibility of autonomously engaging in sexual acts, not in any other external goods.

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