Symmetrical Grounds of Metaphysical Indeterminacy

Mara Zschommler

University of Bern

Metaphysical grounding is a popular tool of contemporary metaphysics (see e.g., Jonathan Schaffer (2009), Gideon Rosen (2010), Karen Bennett (2011), Kit Fine (2012)). Grounding claims express a presumed hierarchical structure in our world and are intimately tied to the idea of metaphysical explanation. For example, the fact that Chad likes cars and the fact that Chad likes protein shakes together ground the conjunctive fact that Chad likes cars and protein shakes. Here, the conjuncts together fully ground their conjunction. Taken individually, each conjunct merely partially grounds the conjunction.

Recently, some have argued for the possibility and coherence of metaphysical indeterminacy, an indeterminacy which has its source in the world, rather than in our language or knowledge of the world (see e.g., Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams (2011) and Jessica M. Wilson (2013)). For example, if we believe that the future is open, then today, it might be metaphysically indeterminate whether Chad will cheat on his girlfriend tomorrow.

In this talk, I bring both grounding and metaphysical indeterminacy (henceforth “indeterminacy”) together by investigating the following question: What grounds indeterminate facts (that is, facts of which it is indeterminate whether they obtain)? In this talk, I propose and defend one principle which I deem plausible when it comes to the grounds of indeterminate facts. This principle captures a symmetry which is plausibly present whenever we consider an indeterminate fact: It seems reasonable to suppose that if fact [X] is indeterminate, then so is [not-X]. For example, if it is indeterminate whether Chad will cheat on his girlfriend tomorrow, then it is plausibly also indeterminate whether it is false that Chad will cheat on his girlfriend tomorrow. I argue that this symmetry is reflected in the grounds of indeterminate facts:

(Symmetry) For every indeterminate fact [X], if [Y] is a ground of [X], then [Y] is also a ground of [not-X]

For example, if the fact that Chad got into a relationship today partially grounds the indeterminate fact that Chad will cheat on his girlfriend tomorrow, then it also grounds the fact that Chad will not Cheat on is girlfriend tomorrow. In my talk, I discuss this principle.

Chair: tba

Time:

Location:


Posted

in

by