Mykolas Lekevičius
Vilnius University
Claims that logic is not normative (Russell 2020; Hattiangadi 2023) stem from the decline
in believing that logic has a special role in reasoning (Harman 1986). Albeit Russell (2020) does claim that the source of normativity can be external, but the laws themselves are descriptive as those found in physics or mathematics. By adopting Leech’s (2015) approach to normativity and choosing Shaw’s (manuscript) demarcation of what logic is normative for, I argue for the normativity of logic. It Is done by showing that not only Hale’s (2002) intuitive approach cannot hold as an argument for normativity, as Leech correctly indicates, but that the argument by McFetridge (1990) which she takes as saving the normative account is undermined by Russell’s nihilism (2018). Therefore, I propose a novel approach of using the Adoption Problem (Birman 2024; Kripke 2024; Padro 2015) as an argument for the normativity of logic. It is done by showing that Harry, the reasoner unable to infer in accordance with UI, cannot evaluate (Steinberger 2019) UI inferences with regards to logic as well. Thus, Harry lacks the capacity to form a normative claim based on logical relations and cannot be taken as a regular reasoner – in other words – the capacity for such normative evaluations constitutes thinking.
I claim that logic is normative for inferences rather than reasoning processes (rational belief
change), because this lets us narrow our scope to only deductive inferences which can take part in reasoning processes. I differentiate between theory of logic/docens (Padró 2015)/artificialis (Martin 2025) and logic of ordinary reasoners in inferential practice/utens (Padró 2015)/naturalis (Martin 2025). Therefore, I’m not arguing for the normativity of logical statements, but rather for the normativity of a logical capacity without which a reasoner cannot be claimed to think, due to its constitutive role.
Chair: tba
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SOPhiA 2026 