Bianca Zito
University of Florence
Language is often treated as a transparent vehicle for sharing not only practical information, but also our inner states and knowledge about the world. Despite this assumption, I argue that language is a culturally evolved cognitive gadget that does not merely represent the world, but restructures the cognitive practices through which knowledge is formed. The analysis draws on the concept of “cognitive gadget” proposed by Heyes (2018), while arguing that language is a peculiar case among such gadgets: it restructures higher-order cognition and stabilizes shared cognitive practices.
The presumed transparency of language is often justified by its practical success, particularly in the context of scientific theories that successfully predict future events. However, this view neglects the role language plays in shaping cognitive processes. Empirical evidence suggests that language influences in some extent even perception (Simanova et al., 2016). This evidence, together with cross-linguistic variation in mental-state vocabulary (e.g., the absence of terms equivalent to “mind” in some languages), raises the question of the extent to which language shapes our cognitive practices.
A possible answer emerges from accounts of the evolution of language. Following the line introduced by Tomasello (1995, 1999, 2008), I argue that language can be understood as a culturally stabilized communicative system that may have originally developed for practical coordination and reasoning. I then compare this account with theories of communication that follow the work of Grice (1969), which offer a powerful explanation of linguistic meaning but are difficult to fully naturalize within an evolutionary framework.
If language is a cognitive gadget that shapes our cognitive processes, linguistic practices may introduce systematic biases in the way objects of knowledge are conceptualized. Consequently, language may be considerably less transparent than we are typically inclined to believe.
Bibliography
Grice, H.P. (1969). “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions”. Philosophical Review 78 (2): 147-177. Doi: 10.2307/2184179
Simanova, I., Francken, J. C., de Lange, F. P., & Bekkering, H. (2016). “Linguistic priors shape categorical perception”. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 31(1), 159–165. https://doi.org/10.1080/23273798.2015.1072638
Tomasello, M. (1995). “Joint attention as social cognition”. In C. Moore & P. J. Dunham (Eds.), Joint attention: Its origins and role in development (pp. 103–130). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjsf4jc
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. MIT Press
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