Are mechanisms something more than causal pathways? Lessons from chemistry and biology

Stavros Ioannidis & Stathis Psillos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

In our (2022) book Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics?, we argued that mechanisms in science are causal pathways that produce the phenomena. We have offered this general characterisation of mechanism as one that, in contrast to more well-known alternative accounts, is primarily a methodological notion, practice-based, common across fields, topic-neutral, diversifiable and ontologically minimal. For some philosophers, however, the notions of mechanism and pathway are to be viewed as really distinct. In this talk, we criticise such a view. Our strategy will be to show that the various ways that philosophers have offered to establish the distinction cannot really be used to distinguish between the two notions as they are used in practice, by focusing on examples from chemistry and biology. We will thus argue against the proliferation of causal notions in scientific practice and use this discussion to motivate our more minimal methodological view.

Time: September 4th, 1400 – 15:30

Location: E.002