When Are Credibility Deficits Unjust? Testimonial Injustice and Social Power Asymmetries

Robin Waldenburg

Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Since its introduction by Miranda Fricker, the concept of epistemic injustice, which describes a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower, has seen a remarkable rise, becoming a widely cited framework in contemporary feminist theory. Given the extensive literature on its foundations, nature, and application, it is striking that the one of its most prominent forms, namely testimonial injustice, remains somewhat under-specified: Critics have questioned Fricker’s definition, according to which it consists in identity prejudices causing a hearer to believe a speaker less than she normally would, resulting in a credibility deficit. The concern is that this definition may include cases we would not intuitively regard as unjust, and exclude cases we would. If so, the conditions under which something counts as testimonial injustice, require clarification. A promising approach by Ishani Maitra proposes that only when there is a pre-existing interpersonal relationship between hearer and speaker, a special obligation to avoid identity-prejudicial credibility deficits is evoked. While the appeal to special obligations is convincing, however, the focus on interpersonal relationships seems inadequate. By zooming in on the central cases brought forward by Fricker and Maitra, I try to show that the essential feature of testimonial injustice lies instead in social power asymmetries between speaker and hearer. Theoretically, this is supported by the idea that power comes with the obligation to use it the right way, and that power asymmetries create a relation of vulnerability, which imposes on those whom others are vulnerable to a special responsibility. My account, I argue, best captures intuitions about injustice, including cases in which no particular interpersonal relationships or social roles can be identified yet the credibility deficit seems unjust. It thus contributes to a better delineation of the scope of the concept of testimonial injustice.

Chair: Paulina Oppermann

Time: 05 September, 11:20 – 11:50

Location: SR 1.004


Posted

in

by