Cong Chen
Zhejiang University
A spectre of anti-physicalism haunts philosophy of mind: we cannot explain how phenomenal experiences emerge from physical or functional bases, and a residual mystery—a explanatory gap—remains. Rather than repeat clichés about the profundity of this explanatory gap, in this paper, I defend a set of Trivialisms, which suggest the gap for the penomenal may not be as special as widely assumed. These Trivialisms do not all claim that the phenomenal gap is meaningless or trivial; rather, most argue that whenever exploring reality, we encounter explanatory gaps in various fields, and the phenomenal one is no more special than others.
In Section 1, I survey Schaffer’s version of Trivialism, characterized by anti-exceptionalism and the thesis of non-specialness. Anti-exceptionalism is a descriptive thesis: explanatory gaps arise whenever there is a grounding relation between the more fundamental and the less fundamental. The thesis of non-specialness is normative: the phenomenal gap is not uniquely special, or at least not more special than other gaps. I outline the implications of Schaffer’s Trivialism (which apply across all versions of Trivialism) and then present a strong objection—perhaps the best available in the literature—Aleksiev’s critique of the thesis of non-specialness, and respond to it in defense of Schaffer’s position.
In Section 2, I introduce and defend what I label Radical Trivialism, which holds that though explanatory gaps are everywhere, there are weaker epistemic reasons (i.e., epistemic insensitivity) to posit a gap specifically for the phenomenal (a position I call exceptionalism), and that the phenomenal gap is not as special as other gaps (a more radical version of the thesis of non-specialness). I argue that Radical Trivialism can, in some respects, preempt objections raised in the literature, making it, despite its radical appearance, easier to defend than Schaffer’s version.
In Section 3, I respond to several potential objections to Radical Trivialism, including challenges to the very concept of epistemic sensitivity, objections from metaontological deflationism and the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge, among others.
Chair: Sofia Sgarbi
Time: 05 September, 15:20 – 15:50
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 