There is No Causal Problem for Platonism

Agnes Katona

Central European University

In the metaphysics of properties, commitment to Platonic universals rarely gets seriously considered. The source of the dismissal is the widespread assumption that Platonic universals are causally inert, and that leads to several problems: it makes it hard to explain how we could have any knowledge of them; how they could play any explanatory role in our theories; and it makes them look “mysterious” and “un-scientific”. As a result, naturalistically inclined philosophers tend to reject Platonism outright. My aim in this paper is to refute the main reason for rejecting Platonism about universals—the causal inertness objection. I argue that the objection fails because it relies on an imprecise notion of causal connection. Depending on our view on the nature of causation, the objection either implies that all properties are causally inert, regardless of whether one is a Platonist, or it can be easily answered by the Platonist. Furthermore, on closer inspection, it turns out that framing the problem in causal terms is a mistake and it obscures the real issue: instantiation. But if the real issue is instantiation, then it is a challenge for other theories of properties as well, not just for Platonism, so Platonism does not face any uniquely insurmountable difficulties. Fortunately, the problem of instantiation can be solved; therefore, Platonism remains a viable and defensible position.

Chair: Andres Rodriguez Rojas

Time: 03 September, 14:00 – 14:30 (Cancelled)

Location: SR 1.003