Byron Hyde
University of Bristol & Bangor University
I argue from feminist philosophy of science that diverse science is more objective and extend this argument to make the metaphilosophic point that diverse philosophy is better too.
I begin by arguing that objectivity is a feature of scientific communities rather than individual scientists. While individuals may inevitably carry biases, a scientific community can achieve greater objectivity if it’s structured to identify and correct these biases. As Peter Godfrey-Smith (2008) writes, “a community or population can embody epistemic properties that no individual has” (p. 142).
For a scientific community to be ‘structured correctly’ to achieve the strongest objectivity, it needs to be diverse. To achieve strong objectivity, says Sandra Harding (1992; 2015), voices outside of the traditional academic community need to be heard. Empirical studies seem to confirm this (Woolley et al. 2010; 2015), leading the European Commission (2012) and National Institutes of Health (see Valantine & Collins 2015) to assert that diversity will provide science with an ‘innovation dividend’.
I argue that this supports the view that diverse philosophy is better too. While philosophers don’t often work with empirical evidence (although experimental philosophers do), they do work with theoretical evidence. In fact, it’s in the context of applied ethics (Gaus 2005) and political theory (van der Vossen 2015) that philosophers have expressed the greatest concerns about ideological bias, precisely because the lack of empirical evidence makes it difficult to stop the construction of grand narratives. This means that philosophy, like science, needs diversity to ensure a balanced representation of values.
Similarly, qualities conducive to good science that result from diversity, such as social perceptiveness and parity in conversational turn-taking, are also beneficial to philosophy insofar as the improved collective problem solving that results from them is just as beneficial, if not more so, to philosophy as it is to science.
While there are key differences between science and philosophy, I argue that, insofar as both science and philosophy benefit from an increase in collective problem solving and a decrease in ideological bias, the literature supporting diverse science also supports the view that philosophy is better when it’s diverse.
Chair: Lucas Timmermann
Time: 03 September, 18:10 – 18:40
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 