Sofia Sgarbi
IUSS
My contribution aims to address a puzzle raised by Roy Sorensen, namely assessing whether it is possible to reconcile perceivable absences – such as the disappearance of an object from a scene – with a standard framework of perception, i.e. by providing an argument in which perceivable absences can comply at the very least with the Causal Theory of Perception (CTP), a condition traditionally considered necessary for the perceivability of an object. Besides suggesting such an argument, I will comment on the fact that proposing a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for the perceivability of an object, and of an absence in particular, turns out to be a much more difficult task.
Drawing on the distinction between direct perception and the description of perceptual content, I suggest that what we commonly refer to as the perception of an absence (e.g., the missing computer on a desk) is better understood as the perception of a change in the scene. In this view, the absence is not the object of perception per se, but a constitutive element of a perceptual change —something that can exert causal power in accordance with CTP. If my hypothesis is correct, perceivable absences have been shown to comply with the Causal Theory of Perception in its original version, and thus overcoming one of the main criticisms raised by the cognitivist view.
Chair: Luuk Brouns
Time: 04 September, 11:20 – 11:50
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 