Leonard Paar
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
Alex Gregory has proposed an “unashamedly normative” account of direction of fit according to which “for a mental state that P to be a desire that P is for it to be the case that if not-P, the mental state gives you a subjective reason to make P the case.” I introduce this account and briefly demonstrate its advantages over earlier analyses of direction of fit by Michael Smith and Lloyd Humberstone.
I then point out possible upshots such a normative account of direction of fit (and hence of desire) could have for fitting-attitude (FA) theories of value. The potential is great: FA theories aim to define value in terms of attitudes and normative conditions, and especially desire is often taken to be the fitting reaction to goodness.
I examine how a normative account of direction of fit complements both the reason-first and fittingness-first approaches within FA theory. I conclude that normative accounts of direction of fit are a particularly good match for buck-passing, reasons-first theories of value, and improve them significantly.
Chair: Sanjar Akayev
Time: 03 September, 14:40 – 15:10
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 