New Work on the Naturalness of Law

Yannis Anagnostoudis

KU Leuven

I explore the application of metaphysical naturalness, as conceptualized by David Lewis, to natural law theory, arguing that this framework can resolve longstanding issues within the field. I posit that while natural law is grounded in moral properties, it is not “”perfectly natural”” in the same way as fundamental physical properties like charge or mass. Instead, legal properties supervene on moral ones, with justice emerging as the central, perfectly natural legal property. By framing natural law in terms of degrees of naturalness, we can distinguish natural law theory from legal positivism, particularly in response to moral conventionalism, which conflates moral and legal facts. The argument demonstrates that moral facts cannot be reduced to social conventions, thereby preserving the integrity of natural law.
My paper is divided into three sections. The first examines the relationship between perfectly natural legal properties and the moral domain, identifying justice as the foundational property of natural law. Rawlsian principles of justice are proposed as illustrative of how legal facts derive from moral truths. The second section addresses contemporary legal challenges, such as environmental protection and animal rights, showing how natural law theory, unlike positivism, can incorporate these issues substantively by grounding them in moral naturalness. The final section argues for the redundancy of conventional law within a natural legal framework, suggesting that social coordination does not necessitate legal conventionalism.
By leveraging metaphysical naturalness, the paper offers a robust framework for natural law theory, one that clarifies its distinction from positivism, strengthens its moral foundations, and enhances its applicability to modern legal dilemmas. The analysis underscores the superiority of natural law in integrating ethical imperatives into legal practice, affirming the classical adage that “unjust laws are no laws at all.”

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