Elżbieta Eysymont
University of Warsaw
Contemporary epistemology of modality struggles with fundamental issues concerning the foundations of modal knowledge. Traditional theories of modality often postulate the existence of a “modal facts” or “possible worlds.” As a result, they carry significant ontological burdens and generate difficulties regarding epistemic access to modal truths. Amie Thomasson argues that the core mistake of traditional theories lies in treating modal language as a description of reality’s features. Instead, she claims that modal discourse serves a normative function, expressing semantic rules that govern our use of language. An example is the necessity statement “Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried,” which reflects the linguistic rule: “One ought to use the term ‘bachelor’ only for individuals who are unmarried.” The framework she develops is known as modal normativism. Within this approach, the puzzles of metaphysics and epistemology of modality are reduced to questions concerning the status and function of these rules.
Despite the advantages of this account, several weaknesses of modal normativism have been pointed out. The criticisms concern, among other things, more specific issues such as the risk of circularity or the overgeneration of semantic rules. But there are also critics who strongly oppose this position due to its alleged trivialization of the metaphysics of modality. They consider modal normativism to be fundamentally flawed, unsatisfactory or even superficial. For example, it seems that one can meaningfully ask modal questions that concern more than just current linguistic norms. Language and linguistic rules appear to be contingent, so if they are to determine modal discourse, it turns out that things are merely contingently contingent or contingently necessary.
In my talk, I aim to address this kind of criticism directed at Thomasson’s position. I believe such response might stem from an uncharitable reading of her proposition. A deflationary approach, such as modal normativism, is far from trivializing the modal discourse. Instead, it resolves many of problems and demystifies modality.
Chair: Tobias Lipinski
Time: 04 September, 10:40 – 11:10
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 