Metaphysics and it’s Basic Tools: Tackling the Epistemological Challenge to Revisionary Metaphysics

Matija Rajter

University of Rijeka, Faculty of Philosophy

Revisionary metaphysics faces a threat from the epistemological challenge. The epistemological challenge to revisionary metaphysics, as formulated by Uriah Kriegel, originates from the fact that competing metaphysical theories are typically (1) internally consistent and (2) empirically adequate. In light of this, how can we justify our theory choice? Kriegel considers (a) intuitive adequacy and (b) theoretical adequacy. He then concludes that both (a) and (b) fail to provide us with epistemic justification for our theory choice and that the epistemological challenge still stands.
In this talk I will offer a way in which we can meet the epistemological challenge. Specifically, I think that reflecting on our basic tools (namely, concepts) can give us the justification needed in our theory choice. To this end, while relying on the insight provided by Kevin Scharp, I formulate The Principle of Consistency, which states that ontological priority is had by those entities, phenomena, or properties that are grasped by consistent concepts. I will argue that framing theory choice in terms of consistent concepts opens up a plausible pathway towards epistemic justification.

Chair: Peihong Xie

Time: 05 September, 12:00-12:30

Location: HS E.002


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