Samuele Fasol
Roma Tre University
Scientific knowledge rests on the assumption that nature is not entirely chaotic but lawful. In this talk, I seek to rehabilitate the relevance of the debate between neo-Kantians and logical empiricists concerning this very assumption, indicated as the principle of lawfulness. I begin by outlining why this concept holds a central place within both traditions. Subsequently, I clarify the meaning of lawfulness, distinguishing it from related notions such as causality and uniformity. Drawing partially on Cassirer, I define lawfulness as the idea that nature exhibits functional dependencies. The central part of my analysis explores how we might justify the assumption that nature is lawful. I review three approaches, inspired by either neo-Kantianism or Logical Empiricism, that base this assumption on (i) empirical evidence, (ii) faith, and (iii) practical usefulness. After pointing out the weaknesses of each, I introduce a fourth approach, according to which the assumption of lawfulness is transcendentally justified by its irrefutability: the denial of a lawful nature entails a performative contradiction. While this proposal is not uncontroversial, it warrants serious consideration within the current philosophical debate. If successful, it could offer a new perspective on the neo-Kantian defense of non-relativized a priori principles and prompt a re-evaluation of their position in light of their dispute with logical empiricists.
Chair: Lucas Timmerman
Time: 03 September, 16:00 – 16:30
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 