Is Epistemic Justification Ideologically Problematic?

Andres Rodriguez Rojas

KU Leuven

In recent debates in deontic epistemology, much attention has been given to the role of justification in shaping our understanding of epistemic norms governing belief formation. Some recent detractors of ‘justification talk’ in epistemology have rejected a general norm of justification under the grounds that it is an ideological harmful. One representative of this view is Ichikawa (2024), who has developed an argument against a general norm of justification as a permission to believe. According to his argument, accepting that beliefs must be justified to be epistemically permitted assumes that beliefs commit a prima facie violation of a norm, something inherently risky, and something one must approach with caution. As an alternative, he proposes that every normal belief should be taken as being in epistemically good standing.
In this paper, I argue that a general norm of justification, properly understood, is neither ideologically harmful nor theoretically dispensable. I contend that it is only harmful when it is selectively applied, i.e., when it targets specific beliefs and is not applied uniformly. Since the epistemic justification norm governs over every belief, far from perpetuating conservatism, it works as a safeguard against ideological bias. Furthermore, I contend that Ichikawa’s alternative to the general norm of justification is harmful because of the ideological weight of the notion of ‘normality’ assumed in the idea of a ‘normal belief’. Finally, I conclude that my argument supports the need for a non-factive conception of epistemic justification to adequately account for norms governing permissions to believe.

Chair: Zhengguan Chen

Time: 03 September, 18:10 – 18:40

Location: SR 1.003