Marcin Nowicki
Jagiellonian University
There is an ongoing debate in ethics about the normative force of the difference between identified and statistical victims and whether we it is justified to prefer helping identified ones. A classic example of an identified victim (IV) would be a particular child with a disability who needs a prosthesis, while a statistical victim (SV), would be someone who will suffer injury leading to a disability unless measures are taken to improve traffic safety.
I want to analyse this issue by using original position, a justification device that allows to determine what principles reasonable and rational representatives would choose. They are supposed to make the decision behind the veil of ignorance, guided by the interests of the people they represent, whose properties are unknown to them. For Rawls, the purpose of the original position was to choose principles of justice for the basic structure of society – but it is just a tool, and it is up to us to determine how and for what purpose we use it.
I will discuss how the original position entails rejecting the preference for IV. One way of arriving at that conclusion is to show that, given the structure of original position, we cannot argue for such a preference – because representatives behind the veil of ignorance are unable to distinguish between future IV and SV. SV can be characterised by a certain definite description, which can be fulfilled by different particular people. The thing is, not only SV but also IV can be identified behind the veil of ignorance only by description. Moreover, for both SV and IV there is no fact of the matter as to who they will be – because that is influenced by the chosen principle. Based on that I will argue that preference for IV should be rejected in both practical and theoretical ethics.
Chair: Sarah Köglsperger
Time: 03 September, 17:30 – 18:00
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 