Lea Spiegl
University of Vienna
Trust is traditionally distinguished from mere reliance: while reliance can be directed at both agents and objects, trust is understood as appropriate only toward agents. Departing notably from this standard view, Nguyen (2022) contends that to trust is to adopt an unquestioning attitude which, crucially, also applies to non-agents such as objects and (smart) technology.
I argue against Nguyen that the right way to think about trust is to regard trustworthiness as its object. As trustworthiness is the quality that makes someone deserving of trust, I further propose that it should be understood as a moral virtue. Importantly, while Nguyen agrees that “[t]rust and trustworthiness go hand in hand” (p. 240), he fails to adequately address this connection. Therefore, I aim to show that by expanding the reach of trustworthiness to apply to non-agents, Nguyen’s account seriously risks inflating the notion of trust beyond recognition. Furthermore, his argument in relation to smart technology conflates behavioural imitation with moral agency.
After considering objections to my view—such as the claims that trustworthiness is not a virtue and that smart technologies can qualify as moral agents and therefore trustworthiness—I aim to clarify the conceptual limits of applying trust-related virtues to non-agents.
Reference:
Nguyen, C. T. (2022). Trust as an Unquestioning Attitude. In T. S. Gendler, J. Hawthorne, & J. Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7, pp. 214–244. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0007
Chair: Karol Milczarek
Time: 05 September, 11:20 – 11:50
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 