Tamaki Komada
Hokkaido University
This paper addresses the mixed inference problem within correspondence pluralism, which holds that the nature of truth is always correspondence, but that the way propositions correspond to reality varies across domains (Sher, 2013, 2015, 2023; Barnard & Horgan, 2006, 2013; Horgan & Potrč, 2008). For example, “”Snow is white”” may correspond directly to reality, while “”Torturing cats is wrong”” may do so in a more indirect way. The paper explores how such variation in correspondence types challenges truth preservation in logical inferences.
The mixed inference problem arises when an inference’s premises and conclusion depend on different modes of correspondence, raising concerns about whether truth can be preserved. For instance: “”If snow is white, then torturing cats is wrong,”” and “”Snow is white,”” seem to validly entail “”Torturing cats is wrong.”” But if these propositions rely on distinct kinds of correspondence, it becomes unclear how truth is preserved across the inference, threatening its validity.
To resolve this, the paper introduces the notion of generic correspondence—a determinable truth property that underlies both direct and indirect correspondence. Drawing on property theory (Wilson, 2023; Funkhouser, 2006), just as the determinable “red” encompasses determinates like “crimson,” generic correspondence encompasses different specific modes of correspondence. Any proposition exhibiting direct or indirect correspondence also exhibits generic correspondence.
This allows for truth preservation in mixed inferences: despite differing modes, all propositions involved share a common truth property. The approach reconciles logical validity with the diversity of truth in correspondence pluralism. In conclusion, the paper offers a unified solution to the mixed inference problem, showing how correspondence pluralism can preserve truth across inference while retaining pluralist commitments.
Chair: David Holtgrave
Time: 03 September, 18:10 – 18:40
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 