Julia Knight
Seton Hall University
William Clifford argues in “The Ethics of Belief” that it is wrong to believe anything without sufficient evidence. This claim is problematic for religious beliefs, which typically do not rely on evidence for justification. Should all non-evidential religious beliefs be rejected to uphold Clifford’s principle? In this essay, I outline three major problems with Clifford’s view: (1) that “sufficient evidence” is poorly defined, and the extent of justification required is unclear, (2) that evidentialist justification creates a limited scope for what is possible to believe, and (3) that Clifford’s principle is acontextual and cannot be applied to subjective beliefs. Instead, I propose an ameliorative Kierkegaardian view for justified religious belief, which seems to be more viable because of how it avoids and responds to the challenges to Clifford’s argument.
Chair: Petr Jošt
Time: 05 September, 14:00 – 14:30
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 