Julianna Végh
Eötvös Loránd University
What sets apart mental states from others – in other words what is the mark of the mental? Many philosophers (like Brentano, Bryne, Crane and Tye) have argued that it is intentionality: mental states are directed at something or are about something. They represent things to us, and how they represent these things constitutes their content.
However, there is an easy way to counter this theory. If there are mental states which are not intentional then intentionality cannot be the mark of the mental, the property that characterises all mental states and only mental states. And there seem to be such states, namely moods. Some affective states, such as euphoria, irritability, depression and anxiety do not seem to be directed at anything. While we are angry at our neighbour, we are not irritated at or about something – we are just irritated.
Intentionalists, of course, try to show that moods are intentional states also. The argument usually goes like this: if we take x (the world, series of things, undetermined objects (Rossi), unbound properties (Mendelovici)…) as the intentional object of moods, their other properties can be explained. This, however, only shows that moods can be fit into an intentionalist theory – not that they have to be intentional.
But there could be another way to argue that moods are intentional states. We can assess whether our moods are intelligible or fitting (Hatzimoysis, Mitchell, Rossi) (maybe even correct or rational (Bonard, Bradley)). We can do this only if moods represent something to us. There is a distinction between how things are and how things get represented (how they appear) to us, and we assess these representations in the light of certain criteria. If being intentional means representing something to us, then moods are intentional. If so, moods are not counterexamples to the theory that intentionality is the mark of the mental.
Chair: Raffaele Giovanni Caravella
Time: 05 September, 11:20 – 11:50
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 