The Single-Genus View of Grounding and Causation

James Ross

University of Southampton

Grounding and causation, so the story goes, are types of causal relation: grounding is metaphysical causation; causation simpliciter is nomological causation (Wilson, 2018). Specifically, they’re species of a causal genus; their differentiae are the laws that mediate them. While the role of a genus-species relation is prima facie unclear, I think the view can be read productively in two ways, each bearing upon the unity of grounding and causation. According to what I call the ‘Weak’ interpretation, grounding and causation are species of a genus to which they’re not essentially connected. Here the challenge is to show how the genus does more than classify its species. According to what I call the ‘Strong’ interpretation, grounding and causation are species of a genus to which they are essentially connected. While grounding and causation differ according to their differentiae, a single genus constitutes part of their essences and explains the important features they have in common. I conclude we reach a stumbling block either way. The Weak interpretation underdetermines the nature of the genus-species relation, failing to be metaphysically illuminating. The Strong interpretation handles differences between the two species poorly. On both counts I suggest we turn our attention to other ways of explaining the unity between grounding and causation.

Chair: Andres Rodriguez Rojas

Time: 03 September, 15:20 – 15:50 (Cancelled)

Location: SR 1.003