On group know-how

Satsuki Inoue

Chiba University

This presentation explores the nature of knowledge-how, focusing in particular on whether a group can possess such knowledge. It defends a reductive account of collective knowledge-how, arguing that what is often taken to be collective in nature is reducible to the individual knowledge-how possessed by members of the group—and further, that such individual knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge.
In general, there are two prevailing views concerning collective knowledge-how: (A) that it is reducible to the knowledge-how of individual members; and (B) that it is not. Most of philosophers has tended to reject (A) and endorse (B) (see Poston, 2016 [in part]; Palermos et al., 2018; Dragos, 2019). adherent of (B) often cite tandem cycling, scientific experimentation, and orchestral performance as paradigmatic examples of knowledge-how that is genuinely collective and cannot be reduced to the capacities or know-how of individuals alone.
However, I argue that even if such examples are indeed paradigms of collective know-how, it does not follow that they are analytically appropriate. On the contrary, I suggest that these complex cases may obscure rather than clarify the core issues. To support this claim, I draw on the work of Peet (2019), who analyses individual knowledge-how through relatively simple tasks. Following this strategy, I argue that collective knowledge-how should also be examined in similarly simplified scenarios. Seen from this perspective, the case for the reductive view (A) becomes significantly more compelling.
Finally, the presentation briefly addresses the well-known question of whether individual knowledge-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge. While the reducibility of knowledge-how to knowledge-that remains contested, I argue that at least some forms of knowledge-how—particularly those acquired through instruction—should be regarded as a kind of propositional knowledge.
In conclusion, these considerations support the conclusion that collective knowledge-how is reducible to individual knowledge-how, and that individual knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge.

Chair: Lea Spiegl

Time: 05 September, 14:00 – 14:30

Location: SR 1.003