Ida Miczke
University of Warsaw
The aim of this paper is to propose an account of the procreation asymmetry: a pair of seemingly incompatible judgments stating a moral obligation to refrain from conceiving a miserable child but at the same time denying the existence of any obligation to conceive a happy child (see e.g. Frick, 2020, McMahan, 1981, Roberts, 2011). Investigating several well-known arguments in favour of the asymmetry (in particular Narveson, 1967, 1973, 1978 and Bennett, 1978, and the critical response from Sprigge, 1968), I argue that a common pattern in their structure can be discerned. This pattern points to a deeper yet unnoticed asymmetry that could ground our procreative duties: the asymmetry between duty-violation and duty-fulfilment. This asymmetry, in turn, reveals an important aspect of our perception of moral duties: we see them as primarily guarding us against the infringement of our interests by “the bad guys”, to paraphrase the famous quote by John Harris (2013). To support my claim, I bring three arguments. First, I show that the duty-violation/duty-fulfilment asymmetry explains the structure of the common argument in favour of the procreation asymmetry and that it enables the proponents of the argument to defend themselves from a common criticism. I demonstrate how the asymmetry is grounded in the interpretation of duty that stands behind their reasoning. Second, I argue that the asymmetry accords well with empirical findings in the psychology of blame and praise (Guglielmo & Malle, 2019, Anderson et al., 2020, Ngo, Kelly, Coutlee et al. 2015). Third, I show that it gains additional support from a related asymmetry in intentional ascriptions known as the Knobe effect (Knobe, 2007, Holton, 2010).
References:
Anderson, R. A. et al. (2020). A Theory of Moral Praise. “Trends in Cognitive Sciences”, 24(9), 694-703. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.06.008
Bennett, J. (1978). On Maximizing Happiness. In R. Sikora and B. Barry (Eds.). “Obligations to future generations” (pp. 61-73). Temple University Press.
Frick, J. (2020). Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry. “Philosophical Perspectives”, 34(1), 53–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12139
Guglielmo, S., Malle, BF. (2019). Asymmetric morality: Blame is more differentiated and more extreme than praise. “PLoS ONE”, 14(3), e0213544. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213544
Harris, J. (2013). ‘Ethics is for bad guys!’ Putting the ‘moral’ into moral enhancement. “Bioethics”, 27(3), 169-173. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01946.x
Holton, R. (2010). Norms and the Knobe Effect. “Analysis”, 70(3), 417–424. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq037
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Knobe, J. (2007). Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology. “Midwest Studies in Philosophy”, 31(1), 90-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00146.x
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Narveson, J. (1978). Future People and Us. In R. Sikora and B. Barry (Eds.). “Obligations to future generations” (pp. 38-60). Temple University Press.
Ngo, L., Kelly, M., Coutlee, C. et al. (2015). Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality. “Sci Rep” 5, 17390. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep17390
Roberts, M. (2011). An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation. “Philosophy Compass”, 6(11), 765–776. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00435.x
Sprigge, T. (1968). Professor Narveson’s Utilitariansm. “Inquiry”, 11(1-4), 332-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201746808601541
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SOPhiA 2026 