Leon Isenmann
University of Potsdam
Recent years have seen the rise of a discussion in metaphysics regarding the status of individuals in our ontology: the basic question in this regard is whether we should admit individual entities into our fundamental ontology or think of reality as being comprised of structure without individuals. Ontic structural realism (OSR) argues for the latter view: proponents of OSR argue that fundamentally, reality consists of structure, and nothing but. Contrary to this position are the particularists, who think that talk about reality ought to feature not only relations, but also individual entities which are being related. This paper aims to reconstruct the core-arguments of the debate between structuralists and particularists, and to raise three arguments in favor of particularism.
I will start out by reconstructing why proponents of OSR think their theory is both possible and desirable. Generally, OSR is thought to be possible because (1) there is a promising formalism for it in the form of Dasgupta’s algebraic generalism, and (2) because OSR can reconcile the ‘no-miracles-argument’ for scientific naturalism with the so-called ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ against ontological certainty. Moreover, OSR is thought to be desirable because (3) it fits with our best current scientific theories. The argument for this is that the quantum-measurement-problems in fundamental physics invalidate the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) and therefore are an argument against fundamental individuals.
Going from there, I will map out the particularist response. Against, (1), the worry is that although algebraic generalism is the strongest contender for a formalism of OSR, it suffers from so-called entailment problems, which render intuitively necessary entailment-statements mysterious. Against (2), the argument is that current explications of structure-retainment without ontological retainment lack a clear explanation for the concrete features of the supposedly tracked structure. Contrary to (3), it is not straightforward that the quantum-measurement problems preclude particularism, because there are several plausible accounts for individuality that don’t rest on PII.
I will conclude by arguing that particularism is also a desirable metaphysical stance because (i) relations without relata are fundamentally incoherent, (ii) particularist ontologies are apt to explain explanatory connections between ontological levels, and (iii) particularism has a coherent formal and metasemantical framework in the form of classical logic and inferentialism.
Literature
Arroyo, Raoni; Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker (2024): “Quantum ontology de-naturalized: What we can’t learn from quantum mechanics”; Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39(2), 193-218
Briceño, Mumford, (2016), “Relations all the Way Down? Against Ontic Structural Realism”, in Marmodoro, A. and Yates, D. (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198-218.
Busse, Ralf (2020), “Against Metaphysical Structuralism – A Case Study on the Apriori Dimension within Inductive Metaphysics”, grazer philosophische studien (2020) 1-33.
Dasgupta, Shamik (2016): “Can We Do Without Fundamental Individuals? Yes.” In: Current Controversies in Metaphysics. Edited by Elizabeth Barnes, London: Routledge,7–23.
French, Steven, and Michael Redhead, (1988), “Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 2 (1988): 233–46.
Frigg, Roman, Ioannis Votsis, (2011), “Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask”, Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:227–276.
Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. (2007), “Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E.J. (2016), “There Are (Probably) No Relations”, in Marmodoro, A. and Yates, D. (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 110-12.
Chair: Zhengguan Chen
Time: 03 September, 17:30 – 18:00
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 