Luuk Brouns
Radboud University
This paper argues that folk psychology is not a universal occurrence but a culture-specific adaptation of WEIRD societies (societies categorised as Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic). This opposes the standard mindreading approach. This conventional approach holds that (a) folk psychology results from a universal cognitive capacity called “mindreading,” and (b) the resulting core folk psychology is not affected by cultural variation (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Carruthers, 1996; Fodor, 1998; Gopnik & Wellman, 1998; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Scholl & Leslie, 1999).
The non-universalist approach I defend in this paper is based on the integration of mindshaping (McGeer, 2007, 2021; Zawidzki, 2013) and interactionism (Gallagher, 2004; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). The integrated approach holds that (i) social practices such as (over)imitation, norm enforcement/following, pedagogy and narrative practices, shape the minds of individuals such that they can regulate their behaviour in accordance with a variety of culture-specific norms, and (ii) these cultural practices vary so significantly that analysing them in terms of belief and desires is unwarranted and insufficient. Some cultures, especially WEIRD societies, have developed narrative practices that include folk psychological narratives, involving conceptual tools such as beliefs and desires (Hutto, 2008). These are useful within their cultural context. However, the actual analysis of a culture that differs significantly from WEIRD cultures, that of Samoa, shows that not all societies require folk psychology. On my account, Samoa exemplifies how a well-functioning society can thrive without engaging in folk psychological practices. I thus conclude that, when actual social practices are considered, it turns out that folk psychology is not a universal occurrence.
Chair: Raffaele Giovanni Caravella
Time: 05 September, 10:00 – 10:30
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 