Does Mary Midgley show that the no-self thesis is mistaken?

Mustafa Khuramy

University of Hertfordshire

Midgley (2014) wrote a book where she argues for the claim that some philosophers and scientists are mistaken to believe that we are not selves; that the ‘self’ (typically understood) does not exist. Call this doctrine the no-self thesis (NST). In what follows, I outline Midgley’s arguments against the NST. I find that her strongest argument seems to be one from a threat of contradiction. I argue that introducing tools from meta-ontology not only gives us a unique angle to handle arguments from contradiction. Then, I explain how these tools fare better than the fictionalist approaches Midgley argues against.

Chair: Sofia Sgarbi

Time: 05 September, 14:00 – 14:30

Location: SR 1.007