Elias Gambarte
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
In his Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein attempts to show more explicitly than in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus why we cannot talk about ethics. In propositions, expressions such as ‘good’, ‘valuable’ or ‘right’ can only have a relative meaning. If ethics attempts to express something beyond relativisation – in other words, something absolute – such achievement cannot be attained in a propositional form. However, insofar as meaningful language is bound to a propositional form, since only in this form can facts be depicted and thus something meaningful be said, there can be no meaningful ethical sentences. In this sense, the tendency to write or talk about ethics is “”to run against the boundaries of language””.
I will focus my analysis of Wittgenstein’s argument on his remarks regarding what it means to wonder about something, in which he distinguishes between two forms. The first form can be identified by three characteristics: (i) it is caused by a fact that seems unusual to us; this presupposes that (ii) we can imagine that it would be otherwise – in this respect, wondering at a fact is wondering at the fact that X* and not X is the case, since it is unusual that X* and not X is the case. A third characteristic then follows from (i) and (ii): By explaining why X* and not X is the case, everything astonishing about the fact that X* is the case will disappear.
I will show that the second form of wondering about something, which Wittgenstein identifies, is opposed to the first form in all three characteristics. In analysing these two forms, a concept central to Wittgenstein’s argument about the ineffability of ethics will become clear: indisputability. This finally allows us to concretise Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics, namely as the attempt to formulate something indisputable without relativising it into a disputable fact, which is in his words “”hopeless””.
Chair: Marianna Leventi
Time: September 12th, 10:00 – 10:30
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 