Nicolas Cuevas-Alvear
University of Bayreuth
The question about how language and reality are related has been central to the discussion in philosophy of language. At the heart of this dialogue lies Frege’s theory of mediated reference, which delineates the functional structure of language by using logic and his semantical distinction between sense and reference. However, Frege´s conceptualization of reference as a predominantly substance-concept, where the reference is intrinsically tied to the designated entity or substance, encounters the challenge of the problem of predication, elucidated by Davidson (2005). In a nutshell the problem is that if every term has a reference, then predicates should have reference and even relational terms must have one too. The semantic problem is how the semantic properties of the constituents of a sentence enable it to have meaning. Davidson’s theory of interpretation solves the problem of predication by focusing on the functional structure of language and its implications on semantics taking an holistic approach. His proposal is Convention T, which sidelines the concept of reference in favor of the notion of satisfaction to explain the formal relation between singular terms and sentences. Nevertheless, Davidson’s model falls short in fully articulating the world-language relationship, treating the pragmatic implications of the theory somewhat superficially.
To bridge this gap and illuminate the pragmatic consequences of Davidson’s theory of interpretation, I propose an integrative approach. By reading Davidson’s theory through the lens of Cassirer’s functional approach about concepts and his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, I argue that the notion of reference is a function-concept. In my view, an object is a functional or normative role an expression can have within the dynamics of an utterance. This role is determined by the background of normative relations the expression has within the language of the speaker at stake in the utterance.
References
Cassirer, E. (1923). Substance and Function: and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The Open Court Publishing Company Chicago.
Cassirer, E. (1955). The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 1: Language. Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1998). The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 4: The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms. Yale University Press.
Davidson, D. (1967). “Truth and Meaning”. In Davidson, D. (1984), Inquires into Truth and Interpretation: 17-36. Oxford Clarendon Press Inc.
Davidson, D. (1973). “Radical Interpretation”. In Davidson, D. (1984), Inquires into Truth and Interpretation: 125-140. Oxford Clarendon Press Inc.
Davidson, D. (1974). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In Davidson, D. (1984), Inquires into Truth and Interpretation (183-198). Oxford Clarendon Press Inc.Objectualización de un aspecto de un evento.
Davidson, D. (2005). Truth and Predication. Harvard University Press.
Frege, G. (1948). “Sense and Reference”. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 57, No. 3: 209-230.
Heis, J. (2014). “Substanzbegriff und Funktionbegriff“. The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4. No. 2: 241-270.
Wheeler, S. (2014). Neo-Davidsonian Metaphysics: From the True to the Good. Routledge.
Chair: Horia Lixandru
Time: September 11th, 13:30 – 14:00
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 