Chandra Kethi-Reddy
University of Central Florida
In this presentation, I will defend the claim that for any theory of knowledge or justification, such a theory ought to be self-referentially consistent. Self-referential consistency means that if a theory purports to explain a domain where the theory itself is embedded, the theory must account for itself as well. For example, if knowledge is justified true belief, then the claim that “knowledge is justified true belief” must itself be a justified true belief. Another example: if justification supervenes on internal mental states, then the justification of the claim that justification supervenes on internal mental states must itself supervene on internal mental states.The purpose of articulating this Principle of Self-Referential Consistency is to provide a criterion that can be used to reject any theory or description of knowledge or justification if said theory or description fails to uphold said criterion. The primary defense of this principle rests on the observation that any known theory of knowledge is itself knowledge and hence must account for itself.
Chair: Freya von Kirchbach
Time: September 11th, 14:10 – 14:40
Location: SR 1.003 (online)
SOPhiA 2026 