Mathilde Cappelli
University of Geneva
The aim of this talk is to shed light on the elusive nature of sexual desire by exploring its valence. In the philosophical literature sexual desire has mostly been understood as sexual arousal (i) or desire for sexual activities (ii). I shall explore the suggestion that sexual desire could be understood as an emotional attitude (iii) or as sui generis attitude (iv). I shall argue that the answer to the question of the valence of sexual desire largely depends on the conception of the nature of sexual desire we accept. This should help us decide between the different definitions of sexual desire mention above and so to opt for the most satisfactory option.
I shall start by explaining that conceiving sexual desire as (i) amounts to define sexual desire as a mere primitive attitude (similar to appetite as hunger or thirst), i.e. a physiological process resulting in sensations of arousal of the sexual organs—a view defended, among others, by R. Scruton; Al Spangler; J. A. Shaffer; and I. Primoratz. Correspondingly, the valence of sexual desire would strongly depend on its satiation; i.e. the end of sexual arousal would be positively valenced while its continuation would be negatively valenced. Against this view I shall argue that sexual desire is a more complex and richer attitude than sexual arousal and that its valence does not depend on the end or continuation of sexual arousal alone (§1).
Defining sexual desire as (ii) is to conceive of sexual desire as a subcategory of desire the objects of which are specifically sexual activities—as defended, among others, by B. Richards and S. Morgan. However, I shall demonstrate that this view is doubtful since one can desire sexual activities (e.g. for financial reasons) without being in a state of sexual desire. Furthermore, following this view, the valence of sexual desire would be positive when sexual activities occur and negative when sexual activities do not occur. Yet, I shall argue that there is no such evident dichotomy (§2).
Given the disputable and unconvincing nature of these two definitions I shall consider in a last part whether sexual desire can be better understood as an emotional attitude (iii) or as a sui generis attitude (iv) (§3).
Chair: Melina Bardt
Time: September 11th, 15:30 – 16:00
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 