The Toxin Puzzle and Its Implications for a Theory of Intention

Anita Semerani

UCL

        Imagine you are offered a great deal of money to intend today to drink a toxin tomorrow. This scenario is now commonly known as the ‘Toxin Puzzle’. It is widely acknowledged that in this situation ordinary agents would be unable to form the intention to drink the toxin. Or, at least, we seem unable to form the intention to drink the toxin in the same way as, e.g., we would form the intention to go to the park were we to have arranged to have there a picnic with a friend.
        The present talk has three aims.
        First, to discuss a variety of replies to the following question: why, in the Toxin Puzzle, do we seem incapable of forming the intention to drink the toxin, despite having good reasons for doing so? It has been argued that the explanation of why one cannot form the intention is that the reason one has in the scenario is a state-given reason for forming an intention, and state-given reasons do not constitute real reasons for intentions; or that one cannot form the intention to drink the toxin because one does not see any reason for drinking it, and we can only form an intention when we have reasons for acting in some way; or that the inability is due to the fact that one does not believe that one will drink the toxin, and an intention to do something is (or entails) a belief that you will do so. I will argue that none of the replies to this question that has been suggested in the literature so far is unproblematic.
        Second, I will lay out what, as I take it, is a more satisfactory answer to the question raised by the Puzzle. I will claim that one cannot form an intention to act in some way if one believes one will not even try to act in that way. This explains why one cannot form the intention to drink the toxin because in the Puzzle one believes that one will not even try to drink it.
        Third, I will reflect on what discussing the Puzzle can teach us about the nature of intentions, their conditions, or the rules that govern their rationality.

Chair: Melina Bardt

Time: September 11th, 17:40 – 18:10

Location: SR 1.006