Carla Peri
University of Padua
I argue that haecceities, non-general essential categorical properties of the form being x, or being identical with x, predicated of any particular individual x, are philosophically redundant.
My argument relies on the dependence-theoretic accounts for immanence. Immanence is a characteristic desired in haecceities since it fits well with their individuating role (cf. Diekemper, 2015). Immanence is captured in terms of constitution: substantial universals are constituents of substances, i.e., individuals. Such a relation can be captured in terms of essential dependence, a particular kind of ontological dependence (Fine, 1995). We say that an entity, Φ, ontologically depends on an entity (or entities), Ψ, just in case Ψ is a constituent (or are constituents) in a real definition of Φ.
On the one hand, since a haecceity property, H, constitutes the real definition (i.e., the essence) of any object, x, and H is a feature of x, it follows that x ontologically depends on H. Following Fine (1995), □x(H, x), namely, it lies in the essence of x that it
instantiates H. On the other hand, haecceities are properties which can exist even uninstantiated (Rosenkratz (1995)), There are some worlds in which a haecceity, H, refers to an individual, x, despite its absence. To solve this impasse, it could be argued that it lies in the nature of haecceities that they lock onto a specific individual (Skiba, 2021). In other words,□H(H, x). So, it lies in the essence of any haecceity H that it locks
into x. Accordingly, the relation of dependence ends to take the following direction: the haecceity H ontologically depends on the individual x since x is a constituent in a real definition of H, and the x depends on H since H is a constituent of x’s essence. Therefore, haecceities and their bearers, the individuals instantiating haecceites, are in a relation of mutual dependence or interdependence. In other words, the relation of dependence haecceities-bearers is symmetric.
If haecceities and their bearers are mutually dependent, then haecceities cannot afford the individuation role for which they have been generally endorsed. This violation of strict partial ordering required by grounding determines that haecceities cannot provide explanatory criteria of individuation and identity. The logical conclusion is that haecceities end up being philosophically redundant.
Chair: Annica Vieser
Time: September 11th, 18:20 – 18:50
Location: HS E.002 (online)
SOPhiA 2026 