Dawei Wu
Free University of Berlin
The concept of emergent properties has stirred up much debate. They are typically considered higher-level properties ascribed to complex systems, simultaneously “dependent” and “autonomous”, in the senses to be explicated. The canonical characterization cashes out their “dependence” in the modal term of supervenience and “autonomy” in the causal term of causal efficacy. The concept of emergent properties, however, is famously challenged by the exclusion argument. The concept of emergent properties is shown to be incoherent with the exclusion principle, which forbids systematic causal overdetermination that emergent properties under the canonical characterization are bound to engender. In this project, I explore an alternative characterization, where “autonomy” is cashed out not in causal terms, but in terms of grounding.
Inspired by Elisabeth Barnes’ work that links emergence with fundamentality, I take a step further to transit the fundamentality-based characterization to the grounding-based one. A gap to be bridged for this transition is the problem that the fundamental are merely the ungrounded, which do not necessarily actively ground anything. Facing this problem, I put forth an argument based on ad-hoc-ness: Taking all emergent properties to be fundamental and metaphysically inert is ad hoc, for we lack an explanation of why emergent property qua fundamentalia never engage in the construction of the world and all the work are left for non-emergent fundamentalia.
After justifying my characterization, the following question is whether the required kind of grounding relation exists. I proceed to an argument for grounding relation required by emergent properties. My argument is based on the idea that metaphysical explanation is a guide of grounding: If there are indispensable metaphysical explanations with higher-level properties as explanatia, then we should have ontological commitments to the corresponding grounding relations. Next, I show there are such metaphysical explanations. Then I conclude that it is viable to cash out “autonomy” in terms of grounding. When “autonomy” is so explicated, the exclusion problem is evaded naturally: Since emergent properties are not required to be causally efficacious, there will be no causal overdetermination and also no violation of the exclusion principle.
Chair: Annica Vieser
Time: September 11th, 14:50 – 15:20
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 