Yannik Steinebrunner
University of Basel
Current philosophy of mind exhibits an increasing interest in radical metaphysics of consciousness. On the one hand, there is strong illusionism, denying that consciousness—understood as the entity according to which it is something it is like to be us—exists. On the other hand, there is panpsychism, which posits that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous throughout the universe.
At the same time, consciousness is widely regarded as the hallmark of moral status. Sentientism, the view that conscious experiences are at least sufficient for moral status, is often considered self-evident. However, in light of the emergence of radical metaphysics of consciousness, we must question the implications for sentientism and thus for the moral significance of consciousness in the universe.
This inquiry has recently been explored in relation to illusionism. Many agree that illusionism contradicts sentientism, and some use this contradiction as a basis to mount a reductio against either sentientism or illusionism. However, the implications of panpsychism have to date largely been ignored. This is surprising, since the claim that consciousness is everywhere prima facie carries just as radical implications for sentientism as the claim that consciousness is nowhere. That’s why I will examine to what extent panpsychism and sentientism can be reconciled. Similar to the arguments against sentientism presented by illusionists, I will present a reductio against sentientism based on panpsychism and evaluate its validity.
The reductio goes as follows: If both panpsychism and sentientism are true, then we have to accept panmoralism. However, panmoralism is unacceptable to the panpsychist. Consequently, panpsychism must provide reasons for why entities such as electrons, despite being conscious, lack the relevant capacities required for moral status. This, I argue, can hardly be justified once we accept the tenets of panpsychism’s “”liberal naturalism.”” In essence, the explanatory and ontological commitments of panpsychism conflict with the truth of sentientism. If this is correct, either panpsychism or sentientism must be false. Given that the truth of panpsychism is stipulated, we must conclude that sentientism is false. Panpsychists should thus adopt the same conclusion as the illusionists and reject that consciousness is morally significant. Whether or not this should be taken as a reductio against panpsychism or sentientism, I leave open.
Chair: Melina Bardt
Time: September 11th, 14:50 – 15:20
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 