Lena Golker
University of Vienna
One of Frege’s fundamental principles, as stated in The Foundations of Arithmetic, is that the concept-object distinction must always be considered. The standard reading is that this distinction is an ontological one. My aim is to question the standard reading. To do this, I will first explain what functions are and how they relate to their expressions, arguing that Frege’s explanatory route goes from top to bottom (TB)—from function expression to function. This suggests that whether something is a function depends primarily on features of its expression, not on any ontological features.
Next, I will clarify what concepts and objects are to understand the distinction. I will show that (TB) applies both to concepts, which are certain kinds of functions, and to objects. I will argue that if the classification of something as a concept or an object depends on its expression and its role in a sentence, rather than on ontological considerations, then the distinction cannot be an ontological one.
Wolfgang Künne pointed out that Frege’s route of explanation concerning objects varies, questioning (TB). I will defend (TB) by showing that it can make sense of Frege’s answer to the concept horse problem, a paradox that arises from the concept-object distinction. Thus, the standard reading of the concept-object distinction as an ontological one should be rejected.
References:
Wolfgang Künne: “Funktion und Gegenstand” in: W, Künne (ed.): Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges. Ein Kommentar. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010, p. 180-198.
Chair: Horia Lixandru
Time: September 11th, 15:30 – 16:00
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 